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THE FOREIGN SEAMAN AND THE JONES ACT
STANLEY DONALD MORRISON*
INTRODUcTION
The Jones Act,' as an amendment to the LaFollette-Furuseth Seamen's
Act of 1915,2 broadly provides that:
Any seaman who shall suffer personal injury in the course of his
employment may, at his election, maintain an action for damages
at law, with the right of trial by jury, and in such action all statutes
of the United States modifying or extending the common law right
or remedy in cases of personal injury to railway employees shall
apply .... Jurisdiction in such actions shall be under the court of the
district in which the defendant employer resides or in which his
principal office is located.
This legislation affords "any seaman" or his representatives a right of
action ". . . for such injury or death resulting in whole or in part from the
negligence of any of the officers, agents, or employees of such carrier.
(Italics supplied).
Insofar as the Act is a beneficent innovation supplementing the General
Maritime Law of the United States, it has been held that the statute is to
be liberally construed.4 Thus, as early as 1926, the word "seaman" was held
to embrace a longshoreman injured while working momentarily aboard a
vessel." Nor has the word "negligence" been limited either to omissions of
duty or to neglcctful commissions of acts. Hence, the word has been held to
comprehend a wilful assault upon a member of the crew6 and even upon a
*LL.B., University of Michigan; Member of New York Bar.
'The author wishes to express his gratitude to Professor William V. Bishop, Jr.,
of the faculty of the Law School of the University of Michigan, Messrs. Richard Cyory,
Arnold Knauth, and Bartin Norris of the New York Admiralty Bar-all for their
suggestions, assistance and kind words.
1. 41 STAT. 1007 (1920), 46 U.S.C. § 688 (1946).
2. 38 STAT. 1164 (1915). 46 U.S.C. § 569 (1946); 38 STAT. 1164, 1165 (1915),
as amended, 41 STAT. 1006, 46 U.S.C. §§ 596, 597 (1946); 38 STAT. 1165 (1915),
46 U.S.C. § 656 (1946); 38 STAT. 1166 (1915), as amended, 53 STAT. 1147, 46 U.S.C.
§ 701 (1946); 38 STAT. 1167 (1915), 46 U.S.C. § 712 (1946).
3. 35 STAT. 65 (1908), 45 U.S.C. § 51 (1c46).
4. DeZon v. American President Lines, 318 U.S. 660 (1943); Garrett v. Moore-
McCormack Co., 317 U.S. 239 (1942); Socony-Vacuun Oil Co. v. Smith, 305 U.S.
424 (1939); Alpha S.S. Corp. v. Cain, 281 U.S. 642 (1930); Jamison v. Encarnacion,
281 U.S. 635 (1930); International Stevedoring Co. v. Haverty, 272 U.S. 50 (1926)*
Panama R.R. v. Johnson, 264 U.S. 375 (1924); O'Neill v. Cunard White Star, 16
F.2d 446 (2nd Cir. 1947), cert. denied, 332 U.S. 773 (1947). Mr. Justice Reed, in
Cosmopolitan Shipping Co. v. McAllister, 337 U.S. 783, 790 (1949), said: "The
Jones Act was welfare legislation, that created new rights in seamen for damages arising
from maritime torts. As welfare legislation this statute is entitled to a liberal construction
to accomplish its beneficent purposes.
In considering similar legislation in other fields, we have concluded that Congress
intended that the purpose of such enactments should not be restricited by common law
concepts." (Italics supplied).
5. International Stevedoring Co. v. Haverty, 272 U.S. 50 (1926).
6. Alpha S.S. Corp. v. Cain, 281 U.S. 642 (1930).
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longshoreman.' But the broadest word-the word "any" prefixing the word
"seaman"-has been read, with a questionable amount of judicial frugality,
so much so as to lead to express declarations of abstinence in several cases
upon which discussion is here being undertaken. 8
At the outset, it is-to be remembered that a Court of Admiralty has
a broad territorial jurisdiction which it may exercise in its discretion., Thus,
the problem of seamen suing for injuries under the General Maritime Law
largely is one of forum non conveniens.'0  The cases illustrating this propo-
sition are many and multiform." However, with the Jones Act, the question
becomes one of whether the foreign seaman can sue under the Act as a
matter of right, and not whether he can avail himself of its fruits in the
discretion of the court, although the court be guided by the principles of
7. Jamison v. Encarnacion, 281 U.S. 635 (1930).
8. Circuit Judge L. Hand, in O'Neill v- Cunard White Star, 160 F.2d 446, 448
(2nd Cir. 1947), cert. denied, 332 U.S. 773 (1947), said: "Perhaps Congress might
go even so far as that, granted an occasion pressing enough; but surely there should
the clearest warrant of its purpose to do so, for it is as extreme an exercise of
power as one can well imagine ..." Circuit Judge Swan, in The Paula, 91 F.2d 1001,
1004 (2nd Cir. 1937), cert. denied, 302 U.S. 750 (1937), said: "We think the
intention to legislate for alien seamen who have signed articles abroad on a foreign
ship ought to be clearly expressed before the courts extend the statute to them."
9. Canada Malting Co. v. Paterson Steamships Ltd., 285 U.S. 413 (1932); The
Belgenland, 114 U.S. 355 (1885); Mason v. The Blaireau, 2 Cranch 240 (U.S. 1804);
'[he Diana, 1 Lush. 539, 167 Eng. Rep. 243 (1862); ROBINSON, ADMIRALTY 14-20
(1939). A sterling example of this territorial jurisdiction is The Kaiser Vilhelm der
Grosse, 175 Fed. 215 (S.D.N.Y. 1909), where District Judge Hough assumed jurisdiction
when a German vessel collided with a British vessel within the territorial waters of
France, in consequence of which one of the passengers, an Austrian subject, was injured
and, thereafter, filed a libel here after the British courts had held the German vessel
solely the fault of the collision.
10. Bickel, The Doctrine of Forum Non Conveniens As Applied in the Federal
Courts in Matters of Admiralty, 35 CORNELL L. Q. 12, 19-31 (1949). See Coffey,
jurisdiction Over Foreigners in Admiralty Courts, 13 CALIF. L. REv. 93 (1925). The
tort occurring in our waters by itself and without more is not sufficient to see a
discretionary assumption of jurisdiction. Canada Malting Co. v. Paterson Steamships
Ltd., 285 U.S. 413 (1932). Cf. Heredia v. Davies, 12 F.2d 500 (4th Cir. 1926).
11. Jurisdiction assumed: The Troop, 128 Fed. 856 (9th Cir. 1904) (transportation);
The City of Carlisle, 39 Fed. 807 (D. Ore. 1889) (Inability to travel and no consular
remedy); The Noddleburn, 28 Fed. 855 (D. Ore. 1886), aff'd, 30 Fed. 142 (9th Cir.
1887) (doctors here treated tho libellant); Heredia v. Davies, 12 F.2d 500 (4th Cir.
1926) (no remedy alleged under foreign law); The Navarino, 7 F.2d 743 (E.D.N.Y. 1925)
(question presented on nserits and court assumed jurisdiction then); Klaassen v. Peursum,
1925 Am. Mar. Cas. 498 (S.D.N.Y. 1925) fill libellant, destitute, and witnesses
here); see Hanna Nielsen, 25 F.2d 984 (W.D. Wash., 1928) (no one factor is given, but
as a matter of conflict of laws the court could apply general maritime law rather than Nor-
wegian law); ROBINSON, ADMIRALTY, 18, n. 10 (1939). Jurisdiction refused: The lvaran,
121 F.2d 445 (2nd Cir. 1941) (dismissal conditioned on foreign consulate giving compen-
satorv remedy); The Lynghaug, 42 F. Supp. 713 (E.D. Pa. 1941) (foreign consulate would
hopefully do justice); The Astra, 34 F. Snpp. 152 (D. Md. 1940) (consul would hear
claim); The Estrella, 102 F.2d 736 (3rd Cir. 1938) (foreign law best determined
by foreign authorities); Bonsalen v. Byron S.S. Co., 50 F.2d 114 (2nd Cir. 1931)
(conflict of laws principles; flag law and territorial waters foreign); Pettersen v. The
Bertha Brovig, 92 F. Supp. 895 (S.D.N.Y. 1950) (foreign law gave remedy); Radovic
v. The Prince Pavle, 45 F. Stpp. 15 (S.D.N.Y. 1942); The Alarchen Maersk, 1937 Am.
Mar. Cas. 1531 (S.D.N.Y. 1938) (consul had already assumed jurisdiction); cf. The
Leontios Teryazos, 45 F. Supp. 618 (E.D.N.Y. 1942) (dismissed as could not prove
case, but with leave to renew). Older cases are collected in Robinson, supra, and
Coffey, note 10 supra. The best discussion is Bickel, note 10 supra. In all, however,
there is no clear basis throughout the entire problem of when the courts will assume
jurisdiction. Similar principles apply to the seanien wage cases, though here jurisdiction
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maritime law.12 As a result, if a foreign forum gives a remedy, no matter
how little or how much that remedy is worth, it is completely inapposite
when suit under the Jones Act is brought by a foreign seaman serving oil a
foreign flagship.
BEFORE AND AFTER TlE JONEs Ac'
After the passage of the Jones Act in 1920, the first case to raise a
substantial question was Stewart v. Pacific Steam Navigation Co.,'- in 1924.
Here the seaman was British and had signed on a British flag vessel owned by
the defendant British corporation which had an office and a place of business
within the Southern District of New York. Stewart was injured while he
was on the deck of the vessel when it was in the Panama Canal. lie sued
in the Southern District Court of New York seeking damages under the
Jones Act. A motion to set aside the service of summons was made inasmuch
as suit was brought against a foreign corporation. Brought into play,
therefore, was the question of the meaning of the last sentence of the Act.
If construed as a bestowal of jurisdiction, the action necessarily would have
had to fail as the corporation did not reside it the United States nor was
ils principal place of business in New York. In consequence, the Jones Act
would only be limited to actions against United States corporations. Then
District Judge Learned Hand felt the argument untenable, reasoning that
the broad wording of the last sentence was to be construed "not as a question
of the affirmative bestowal of jurisdiction, but merely as a question of
venue."" In this assertion, he was not without the support of the United
States Supreme Court, which had just upheld the constitutionality of the
Jones Act in Panama R. R. v. Johnson, ' in which case the seaman, an
American citizen on a domestic vessel, was injured while in the territorial
waters of Ecuador. judge Hand then said:
there is no indication of any purpose to limit it to U. S. corpora-
tions, and it would be highly unreasonable to impute any such
purpose to Congress for the result would be not only to deprive
American seamen of the protection which the act was meant to
give them when serving on foreign ships, but to give advantage to
such ships as against American ships. We all know that the purpose
of Congress is directly the opposite. (Italics supplied).
With the Stewart result, we can also say that where a claim sounded
in tort, the ancient maritime law principle of the application of the law of
the flag'0 had begun to yield under the superior mandate of the Jones Act.
is more freely assumed as most foreign goverumnts have atttomatic compensation laws
for seamen suffering personal injury. But in both the personal injury and wage cases,
the assumption of jurisdiction is in no way dependent upon whether or not the seaman
signed articles in a port of the United States. See The Navarino, supra; 2 ItAcKWORTH,
)IGEiSr O0 INTERNArIONAL. LAw 230 (1941).
12. See Panama R.R. v. Johnson, 264 U.S. 373 (1924).
13. 3 F. 2d 328 (S.D.N.Y. 1924).
14. Id. at 329.
15. 264 U.S. 375 (1924).
16. LaBourgogoc, 210 U.S. 95 (1908); United States v. Rodgers, 150 U.S. 249
(1893); In re Ross, 140 U.S. 453 (1891); The Belgenland, 114 U.S. 355 (1885);
The Scotland, 105 US. 24 (1331); Cain v. Alpha S.S. Corp., 35 F.2d 717 (2nd Cir.
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Though nothing of this was expressly made in the opinion, it could never
be said that the principle of the law of the flag was read in terms of absolute
application. Of necessity, the courts have pierced through foreign flags
flown at the stern of some vcsscls. As an example, in Gerradin v. United
Fruit Co.,' 7 the plaintiff, an American citizen, signed articles for shipment
in New York on a vessel which was owned by an American corporation,
but which was registered under the flag of Honduras and then bareboat
chartered back to the United Fruit Company. Gerradin was injured through
the negligence of a fellow-servant while the vessel was at sea under voyage
articles froll New York to Honduras and return. Suit was brought under
the Jones Act. It was held that Gerradin could sue for his injuries under
the American law. Judge A. N. Hand said:
There can be no doubt about the power of Congress to impose a
liability upon its own citizens for acts done on the high seas or at
other places outside its territorial jurisdiction. Section 33 of the
Merchant Marine Act has done this in the case of American citizens
who own ships on which seamen are injured through their negligence
and it seems but a slight disregard of the synbol of foreign registry
to apply an ordinary rule of torts to a shipowner who bears such
an illusory shield.'
Prior to Gerradin it had been held that where the ship's flag and
the domicile of the vessel's owner differ, the law of the latter would
apply., ' Also, where a ship is registered in one state of the United States
and owned in another, the law of the place of ownership would apply. '"
Cerradin, however, could not be so simply resolved as this suit was brought
under the Act. Thus, for purposes of the Act, was one to be considered a
"seaman" if he was serving on an American owned, but foreign registered,
vessel? The Jones Act says nothing expressly. But it did amend the
Seamen's Act of 1915 which applies to "vessels of the United States."'"
This latter Act is amendatory of the Act of 1872 which defines a seaman as
a person employed on a vessel belonging to a citizen of the United States5'
In turn, this was the definition for Gerradin. The practical usage of the
test of ownership, no doubt, is to prevent the avoiding of our legislation by
1929); Grand Trunk R.R. v. Wright, 21 F.2d 814 (6th Cir. 1928); Rainey v.
N.Y. & P.S.S. Co., 216 Fed. 449 (9th Cir. 1914); Thompson Towing & 'AVrecking Ass'n
v. McGregor, 207 Fed. 209 (6th Cir. 1913): Queen v. Anderson, I Cr. Cas. Res. 161
(1868); RESTAT,,ENT, CowlmcT or LAWS, §§ 45, 40i, 406 (1934).
17. 60 I.2d 927 (2nd Cir. 1932), cert. denied, 287 U.S. 642 (1932); 31 CoL. L.
Ry.v 1360; 45 HlAxv. L. Rv. 582.
18. 60 F.2d 927, 929 (1932).
19. Bjolstad v. Pacific Coast S.S. Co., 244 lkd, 6,4 (N.D. Cal. 1917). British
authority would seem to be similar. Chartered Mere. Bk. of India v. Ncteherlands etc.
Co., 10 Q.B.). 521 (1881).
20. Int. Nay. Co. v. Lindstrom, 123 ]'cd. 47; (2nd Cir. 1903 .
21. 38 STAT. 1164, 1184, 1185 (1915), 40 U.S.C. §§ 80, 673 (1946); cf. 38 ST-Ar,
1165 (1915), 46 U.S.C. § 597 (1946). From the indications in the Congressional
Record it would appear that foreign registered, but American owned, vessels were not
thought within it. 51 CoNG. REC. 14343, 14354 (1914); 52 CoNe. R,. 4650 (1915);
cf. 52 CONe. RaC. 4803 (1915).
22. 17 STAT. 277 (1872), 46 U.S.C. § 713 (1946).
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the sham device of foreign registry. And the test of ownership can not be
limited to cases where the claimant is an American citizen or where he
signed articles in an American port.
In Carroll v. U. S.,23 the libellant was an alien who signed on board in
Erie for a voyage to New York. The vessel was Amenrican owned, but was
under Panamanian registry. Carroll was allowed to sue under the Jones Act
for injuries he had received.
Proceeding inward from the results in Gerradin and Carroll we come
to the situation where, rather than a single ownership, there is a multiple
ownership. In Torgersen v. Hutton, 24 the vessel, a schooner, was half owned
by American defendants and half owned by a German corporation. It was,
therefore, ineligible for registry in the American merchant fleet and could
not fly our flag. The plaintiff, a Norwegian, hired as a member of the crew,
was injured through the negligence of a fellow-servant. He sued under the
Jones Act. The New York Court of Appeals allowed the suit. However,
where an American corporation sets up a foreign corporation, holding one
hundred per cent stock interest in that corporation, the result will be
different because the corporate entities arc separate. The vessels of the
foreign corporation will fly the foreign flag, only here the foreign flag
does not yield.
In the fairly recent decision of Sonnesen v. Panama Transport Co, 25 the
plaintiff, a Danish seaman who signed ship's articles in New York, was
injured by a tort while the vessel was on the high seas. The defendant,
the Panama Transport Company, was a Panamanian corporation which regis-
tered its ships under the Panamanian flag. Sonnesen sued under the Jones
Act fordefendant's failure to furnish. prompt medical attention, in conse-
quence of which a tubercular condition was aggravated. Recovery was
denied him. But one of the interesting features of the case is the fact
that the Panama Transport Company is well known to be a wholly owned
subsidiary of the Standard Oil Company of New Jersey. It was begotten
as a creature to allow Standard Oil to run a fleet of its tankers to France
and England in circumvention of the United States Neutrality Law, which
did not touch Panamanian flagships. Concededly, there was no showing
of an attempt to avoid the provisions oF the Seamen's Act as amended by
the Jones Act, but clearly there was the attempt to avoid the Neutrality Law.
Though the device of foreign incorporation creates a separate entity, when
this is designed particularly at the evasion of United States law, it is difficult
to see why there is not a sufficiently strong domestic policy to compel the
law of the flag to yield 2 5-espccially when the law of the flag principle
23. 133 F.2d 690 (2nd Cir. 1943).
24. 267 N.Y. 535, 196 N.E. 566 (1935), cert. denied, 296 U.S. 602 (1935).
25. 298 N.Y. 262, 82 N.E.2d 569 (1948), cert. denied, 337 U.S. 919 (1949); 17
CEO. WAsH. L. Rev. 549 (1949).
26. Under Panamanian Law the seaman signing aboard a Panamanian vessel
consents to have all his rights adiudicated under the laws of Panama. Berguido, The
Rights of a Seaman on a Ship Under Panamanian Registry, 19 TEMP. L. Q. 458
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has been asserted to be one of comity only.27 At times the purpose behind
foreign incorporation can not be so clearly known as in Sonnesen. Then,
it is submitted that the facts which should be examined are the identity of
the directors and/or the incorporators, or the nationality of the management
and/or the controlling stockholders.28
The situation, then, being clear that American owned ships placed
under foreign registry are subject to the provisions of the Jones Act-the
foreign flag here yielding-the case of the American or foreign seaman
shipping on an American flagship and injured on the high seas or in the
territorial waters of a foreign state still sees him the beneficiary under the
Act.219  The law of the flag prevails where the American flag flies. The
Supreme Court has never regarded the occasion of the locus of the tort in
the territorial waters of a foreign state as being determinative where the
flag is American and suit is brought under the Jones Act.
30
Traditionally, the statement of the application of the law of the flag
meant that the flag flown at the vessel's stem would be determinative of
legal rights in eases of tort. Therefore, if an American seaman was on a
British ship, be was to be considered as if he were a Britisher in point of
law, at least when the vessel was on the high seas. This proposition is sup-
ported by many cases?' We have seen an exception to the principle in
Gerradin Carroll, and Hutton. Another now follows.
In Western Fuel Co. v. Garcia,32 a stevedore, an American citizen, was
killed in 1916, four years before the enactment of the Jones Act, while
(1946). But nearly all articles signed for service on foreign ships are of the same
effect. Kyriakos v. Goulandries, 151 F.2d 132 (2nd Cir. 1945) (no application for
certiorari); Cambera v. Bergoty, 132 F.2d 414 (2nd Cir. 1942), cert. denied, 319 U.S.
742 (1943) (no application for certiorari). But it has very recently been decided that
such a provision is to be given full effect on the basis of choice of law. See Lauritzen
v. Larsen, 345 U.S. 571 (1953). Domestic policy could also see the undoing of the
intent of the parties.
27. In re Ross, 140 U.S. 453 (1891); Wildenhns' Case, 120 U.S. 1 (1885); Grand
Trunk R.R. v. Wright, 21 F.2d 814 (6th Cir. 1928); 2 BEALE, CONF1LICT OF LAws, §
405.1 (1935); Draft Con'. Research in Int. Law, 23 Am. 1. INT'L L-kw (Special Supp.)
307 (1929). The above cases and texts all go to "internal economy," where no statute
of the territorial sovereign is involved.
28. 17 CEo. WAsUL. REv. 549 (1949).
29. Alpha S.S. Corp. v. Cain, 281 U.S. ti42 (1930), affirming Cain v. Alpha S.S.
Corp., 35 F.2d 717 (2nd Cir. 1929); Panama R.R. v. Johnson, 264 U.S. 375 (1924);
Wenzler v. Robin S.S. Co., 277 Fed, 812 (D.C. Wash. 1921).
30. 1bid; RoBINsoN, AMItRALTY, '328-329 (1939).
31. In re Ross, 140 U.S. 453 (1891); Tl'he Belgenland, 114 U.S. 355 (1885);
Rainey v. N.Y. & P. S.S. Co., 216 Fed. 449 (9th Cir. 1914); Htogan v. lamburg-Amer.
Line, 152 Misc. 405, 272 N.Y. Supp. 690 (City Ct., N.Y. 1934); Resigno v. Jarka Co.,
221 App. Div. 214, 223 N.Y. Supp. 5 (1st l)ep. 1927), reversed by 248. N. Y. 225,
162 N.E. 13 (1928); Clark v. Montezuma, 217 App. Div. 172, 216 N.Y. Supp. 295
(2nd Dep. 1926). Cl. Plamals v. Pinar del Rio, 277 U.S. 151 (1928). In Thompson
Towing v. McGregor, 207 Fed. 209 (6th Cir. 1913), the law of the flag applied because
the dispute affected "intcrnal economy" of the vessel. See also Carrington v. Panama
Mail Co., 136 Misc. 850, 241 N.Y. Supp. 347 (Sup. Ct. 1929). But when the vessel
is in our waters the result may be different. The Cuzco, 225 Fed. 169 (D. Wash. 1915);
cf. Bennett v. Connelly, 122 Misc. 149, 202 N.Y. Supp. 568 (Sup. Ct. 1923); Geohegan
v. Atlas S.S. Co., 3 Misc. 224, 22 N.Y. Supp. 749 (N.Y. City & Cty. Ct. 1893);
Wingert v. Carpenter, 101 Mich. 395, 59 N.W. 662 (1894).
32. 257 U.S. 233 (1921).
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working in the hold of a Norwegian vessel which was at anchor in San
Francisco Bay. The vessel was under charter to the \Vcstern Fuel Co.-
the employer of the decedent-and flew the Norwegian flag. In an opinion
by Mr. Justice McReynolds, a champion of the "maritime but local"
doctrine, the wrongful death statute of California was applied without any
reference being made to the application of the law of the flag. Allowing
such an action under the statute of California did not work any material
prejudice to the characteristic features of a general and uniform maritime
law.,
3
But with the passage of the Jones Act the problem of the stevedore-
whether alien or American-injured on board a foreign vessel in the territorial
waters of the United States or the Panama Canal Zone began to vex the
courts. In 1926, in Internatioial Stevedoring Co. v. Haverty, 4 the voice
of Mr. Justice Holmes spoke loudly when he proclaimed that a stevedore
injured on an American ship was a "seaman" for purposes of a Jones Act
suit against his employer-stevedoring company. But in 1928, in Resigno v.
Jarka Co.,," an American stevedore died as a result of injuries sustained
while lie was working on a German flag vessel in New York harbor. His
administrator sued the employer under the Jones Act for negligence in
failing to provide a safe place in which to work. The New York Court of
Appeals, speaking through Judge Cardozo, though admitting that the
decedent was a "seaman" under Haverty, denied recovery limiting the Act's
application to domestic vessels.
At the time of Resigo, or soon thereafter, however, the lower federal
courts were contrary and rejected its thinking. On similar facts they agreed
that the stevedores involved were "seamen" under -Iaverty. But they
disagreed with the limitation of the Act to domestic vessels. In so doing
theMj became the procreators of the "privity" doctrine which stated that as
the stevedore had to privity with the vessel, the Act could be applied
against the employing stevedoring company. 3" The decisions of the state
courts of Washington were similar to the results of the lower federal
courts." One decision in the New York state court machincry refused to
follow Resigno while that case was in its appellate stage.""
Yet the Supreme Court had not spoken. However, there was no com-
pulsion upon the federal courts to follow the state law under Erie R. R. v.
33. Sec Washington v. I)awson, 264 U.S. 219 (1924); Knickcrbockcr Ice Co. v.
Stewart, 253 U.S. 149 (1920); Sonthern Pac, Co. v. Jensen, 244 U.S, 205 (1917). The
concept of a moaritire u1niformilty can rooghly he traced back to solne dictum of Mr.
Justice Bradley in The Lottowama, 88 U.S, 558 (18741. Cf. Grant Smith-Porter Ship
Co. v. Rohde, 257 U.S. 469 (1922); The lamilton, 207 U.S. 398 (1907).
34, 272 U.S. 50 (1926).
35. 248 N.Y. 225, 162 N.E. 13 (1928).
36, Ntahouev v. Int. FIev. Co., Inc., 23 F,2d 130 (E.). N.Y. 1927); Zarowitch
v, Iorka, 21 F,2d 187 (E.). N.Y. 1927); Williams v. Oceanic Steve. Co., 27 F,2d
915 (S.D. Tex. 1928), 12 IIARV. L. tlV, 273; Sciolis v. North Coast Steve. Co,, 24
F.2d 591 (W.D. Wash. 1927).
37. R anstroin v. Int. Steve. Co., 12 Wash. 3;2, 277 Pac. 992 (1929); McGiun V.
North Coast Steve. Co., 149 W\rash. 1, 270 Pac. 13 (1928).
38. Muti v. Hocy, 221 App. Div. 688, 221 N.Y. Stpp. 662 (2d Dep't 1927).
FOREIGN SEAMEN
Tompkins,"9 inasmuch as the maritime power is federal. The principle of
Erie is thereby inverted to say that the state courts should follow the
decisions of the federal tribunals. Hence, no federal court was bound to
accept and follow Resigno. It was left only to the United States Supreme
Court to overthrow Resigno. This occurred in the case of Uravic v. Jarka
Co.'" in which a stevedor, an American citizen, was injured on board a
German flag vessel while he was helping to unload it in New York harbor.
The injury later led to his death. Suit was brought by his administratrix
against the stevedoring company asserting as the cause of the injury the
negligence of a fellow-servant. Recovery in the New York courts was denied
on the authority of Resigno. In reversing the court of appeals, Mr. Justice
Holmes, speaking for an unanimous court, stated a far broader doctrine as
to the Act's coverage. The decedent was held to be covered though he
was on board a German flag vessel. It was contended by counsel for the
respondents that the words "any seaman" were defined to mean "seamen
employed upon a vessel belonging to a citizen of the United States." To
this Mr. Justice Holmes replied:
But that section [R. S. Sec. 1612] merely provides that for purposes
of the chapter 'seaman' shall include persons who otherwise might
be deemed not to be seamen. It is directed to extension not to
restriction . T... en it is argued that the grant of jurisdiction to the
Court of the District in which the defendant employer resides or
has his principal office, without granting a proceeding in rem in
the case of tramp steamers from abroad, shows that seamen on a
foreign vessel were not contemplated. But the question is not
whether they were thought of for the purpose of inclusion, but
whether they were intentionally excluded from a description that
on its face includes them. (Italics supplied).
Then continuing, lie said:
But we may go further. Here we arc dealing with the conduct of
persons within the jurisdiction affecting the safety of other persons
within it. If the rule is wise there is no reason why it should not
be universal. \Wise or not, it is the law and the question is why
general words should not be generally applied. What would be
the alternative? Hardly that German law should be adopted. It
always is the law of the United States that governs within the juris-
diction of the United States, even when for some special occasion
this country adopts a foreign law as its own1. 42  (Italics supplied).
And, in concluding his opinion, as if to mark that small ouiter periphery
where the Act would not apply:
If it should appear that, by valid contract or special circumstances,
seamen on a foreign ship should not be protected by the statute,
it will be time enough to consider the exception when it is pre-
sented.43 (Italics supplied.)
39. 304 U.S. 64 (1938.
40. 282 U.S. 234 (19V1, 31 COL. L. Ri-v. 505, 16 CO)R' .L. Q. 371, 26 I L.
RE..v. 72, 5 ST. JoiN's L. RF.v. 260.
41. Id. at 239.
42. Id. at 2;9-240.
4 ,. Id. at 241.
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But to all other seamen, foreign or national, when oil foreign vessels,
with no "contract" or "special circumstances" interfering, the Act would
apply-especially if that vessel is in the waters of th United States.
With this demolition of Resigno, with the broad reading of the statute
that was made in Uravic, the foreign flag did bow when it was within the
waters of the Panama Canal Zon1e44 or the nation that begot the Jones Act.
Therefore, if an actual American seaman is injured while working on a
foreign flagship within the waters of the United States, he can avail himself
of the Jones Act remedy. This was the holding in Shorter v. Bermuda &
West Indies S. S., Ltd. 5  But the fact that in Uravic and Shorter the
claimants were American citizens could not really be regarded as decisive
because the statute makes utterly no distinction on the basis of nationality.
Indeed, several cases have held that the nationality of the claimant is of
ro consequence." Thus, it has been held that a longshoreman of uncertain
nationality injured while on a French ship in the Canal Zone could assert
his claim under the Act.47  The result is consonant with Uravic and gave
rise to the following interesting language:
It is to be presumed that ili adopting Section 33 of the Merchant
Marine Act Congress intended that an injured seaman should have
a convenient forum in the United States in which to assert his
action against aii alien corporation in a foreign country ...
• . . the right of action is give to all seamen regardless of
nationality.4 8
But it is to be remembered that in Uravic, and the cases following it,
the contract of employment, or the signing of ship's articles, was always
made in the United States. This was pointed out in Uravic by Mr. Justice
Holmes. Also, in Uravic, counsel did contend that if the Act was not to
be applied to seamen of a foreign vessel, it was because Congress did not
intend to legislate with respect to vessels which were in the United States
only "transiently."
Before the decision in Uravic there had been clear assertions of the
application of flag law in the New York state courts which left a very
positive impression on the miinds of some federal judges. Thus, a seaman
who had signed articles in a United States port on a foreign vessel was held
not to be able to sue under the Act for injuries received while the vessel
was on the high seas, 49 and notwithstanding the fact that the seaman was a
44. Panama Agencies Co. v. Franco, Ill F.2d 263 (5th Cir. 1940), where quoting
fron Panama R.R. v. Johnson, 264 U.S. 375 (1924), Circuit Judge Sibley said: " 'The
statute extends territorially as far as Congress can make it go, and there is nothing
in it to cause its operation to be otherwise than uniform.' " Arthur v. Compagnie Ceti.
Trans., 72 1. 662, (5th Cir. 1934); Sandoval v. Fruit Express Co., 1944 Am. Mar.
Cas. 580 (D. Canal Zone 1944).
45. 57 F.2d 313 (S.D.N.Y. 1932).
46. Kyriakos v. Goulandries, 151 F.2d 132 (2nd Cit. 1945); Gambera v. Bergoty,
132 F.2d 414 (2nd Cir. 1942).
47. Arthur v. Comp. Gen. Trans., 72 F.2d 662 (5th Cir. 1934).
48. Id. at 664.
49. Hogan v. Hamburg-Amer. Line, 152 Misc. 405, 272 N.Y. Supp. 690 (N.Y.
City Ct. 1934). Cited, in the refusal to apply the Act because articles were signed here, was
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resident of the state of New York. That articles were signed in New York
was inconsequential, as the contract provided that the law which was to
prevail was not that of the place where the contract was made.50 This
assertion overlooks the fact that a statutory imposition could change
ordinary conflict of laws principles. 1 But the extension of the principle was
to be seen in Clark v. Montezuma Transport Co. 2 In this case an American
seaman began working, without formally signing articles, 53 on a British
vessel which was tied to a wharf in the waters of the United States. He
was injured on the vessel and sought recovery under the Act. This was
denied. Only British law was competent to give a remedy. Accordingly,
an American seaman injured on a foreign vessel while it was within the
waters of a foreign nation could not sue under the Act."
The lower federal courts were neither slow nor loath to pick up
the thinking of the New York state courts. When the United States
Supreme Court had an opportunity to speak, it abstained from so doing.
This occasion arose in Plamals v. The Pinar Del Rio53 where a Spanish
seaman, belonging to the crew of a British vessel, was injured through the
negligence of a fellow-servant while the ship was at anchor in Philadelphia.
The action was brought in rem under the Jones Act. The Second Circuit
Court of Appeals held that the Jones Act did not give an in rem proceeding.
Mr. Justice McReynolds speaking for a unanimous court said:
'We agree with the view of the Circuit Court of Appeals and find
it unnecessary now to consider whether the provisions of Section
33 are applicable where a foreign seaman employed on a foreign ship
suffers injuries while in American waters. '
Thus the question was left wholly unanswered.
A case illustrating the dependence upon New York state court thinking
was The Seirstad.57 There the libellant was a Norwegian who had signed
articles on a Norwegian ship in Philadelphia for a voyage from Philadelphia
to Cuba and return. While the vessel was proceeding up the Delaware
River he was injured. He sued on three grounds, one of which was the
Jones Act for alleged negligence. This was denied by District Judge
Oehler v. Hamburg-Amer. Line, 84 Misc. 272, 145 N.Y. Supp. 1090 (Sup. Ct. 1914),
a pre-Jones Act case which refused to apply the New York law as the contract was to be
governed by the law of the place of performance, which was on a German vessel.
50. Oehler v. Hamburg-Amer. Line, 84 Misc, 272, 145 N.Y. Supp. 1090
(Sup. Ct. 1914).
51. See 49 HARV. L. REv. 319 (1935). An equally ambiguous statute in this
respect was applied to foreign vessels during prohibition. Cunard S.S. Co. v. Mellon,
262 U.S. 100 (1923). This, however, was done to effectuate the National Prohibi-
tion Act.
52. 217 App. Div. 172, 216 N.Y. Supp. 293 (2nd Dep't 1926).
53. Nor formally signing articles would not stop the assertion of Jones Act rights
if they existed. The Falco, 20 F.2d 362 (2nd Cir. 1927); Verveis v. Marathon S.S. Co.,
1952 Am. Mar. Cas. 147 (S.D.N.Y. 1951); 1 NORRIS, LAW OF S.AMEN § 91 (1951).
54. Maia v. Lamport & Holt, Ltd., 141 Misc. 140, 252 N.Y. Supp, 201 (2nd Dep't
1931). Cf. Bonsalem v. Byron S.S. Co., 50 F.2d 114 (2nd Cir. 1931).
55. 277 U.S. 151 (1928).
56. Itd. at 155.
57. 27 F.2d 982 (E.D. N.Y. 1928).
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Campbell who saw Plamals as not decisive of the question, but as Clark
and Resigno had answered the question of Seirstad, he felt "constrained" to
hold that the Act was only to be applied to seamen at work on domestic
vesselsY8  Of course, Judge Campbell could not foresee that Resigno would
be overturned in Uravic and that thereby a substantial hole would be drilled
into Clark. Nor did Judge Campbell look far enough into the authorities
upon which Clark was based. If so, he would have observed that all the
cases cited there ante-dated the Act. They stood for the proposition that
the contract of employment related to performance; as the performance was
to be on a foreigi ship it was that law which governed, not the law of the
place of the making of the contract. But the Act could have changed these
rules as it was arguably conceived to equalize the operating costs between
American and foreign shipping.
But with Seirstad deadened by Uravic its place was left to le taken by
another Federal Court decision even more restrictive. It will be recalled
that in Uravic the decedent was an American citizen injured while he was
on a foreign ship. Clark, Resigno, and Seirstad all refused to apply the
Act feeling that it was only intended to cover seamen on America vessels.
This line of thinking was crippled by Uravic. rflhus, on the basis of Uravic,
the Act should only be applied to American citizens. Support for this
conclusion could be mustered from the title of the Seamen's Act of 1915
which literally covered American seamen. Hence, if the seaman was foreign,
he could not sue under the Act. This was the holding in The Magdapur,"
in which case a Britisher signed on a British ship in Ceylon and was hurt
while the vessel was in Baltimore. District Judge Patterson refused the
remedy saying:
The Jones Act was passed for the welfare of American seamen.A'1
(Italics supplied).
Tiis decision was handed down in 1933 and relied heavily on the
results in Shorter and Uravic, at least to the extent that those two cases
concerned American citizens. Yet, in Uravic, Mr. Justice Holmes did not
say that citizenship was the basis of the decision .Indeed, he gave the Act a
far broader reading than a nationality basis would tolerate. As for Shorter,
articles were signed in New York whereas in Magdapur articles were signed
in Ceylon, though nothing was made of these facts in either opinion.
Shorter would then be consonant with Uravic as in the latter case the contract
of employment was American also.
Magdapur concerned a foreign seaman who signed foreign articles, but
who was injured on the vessel while it was within the waters of the United
States. Recovery was denied solely on the basis of nationality. A more
significant case, denying the Jones Act remedy, on similar facts, is the 1937
58. District Judge Campbell said the decisions in Resigno and Clark were approved
by the Second Circuit Court of Appeals. lie cited no cases in which this "approval"
had been made. No such cases can be found.
59. 3 F. Supp. 971 (S.D.N.Y. 19331.
60. id. at 07
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Second Circuit Court of Appeals decision in The Paula." In this case,
the seaman was a German national who signed articles for shipment in Chile
aboard a Danish vessel. The facts in the opinion are not clear, but it appears
that the vessel's voyage was from South America to Florida to New York.
From there it is not certain whether the vessel was to go to Europe or not.
The seaman was injured while aboard the vessel in Jacksonville. He sued
under the Jones Act in ren and in personarn with writ of admiralty attach-
ment when the vessel was found in New York some two months later. The
rationale of Circuit Judge Swan's opinion is confusing, but decisive in its
denial of Jones Act usage. So far as the action was brought under the General
Maritime Law, Judge Swan first decided that a United States-Denmark
Treaty giving the "consular officer ... exclusive jurisdiction over controversies
arising out of the internal order of private vessels of his country ..."
did not apply because a personal injury was not a "controversy" arising out
of the vessel's internal order. But then he declined to reverse the court
below which had refused to take jurisdiction in its discretion because the
mere fact that the cause of action arose in our waters was not decisive of
an exercise of discretionary jurisdiction. Furthermore, Danish Law afforded
a remedy. Then Judge Swan proceeded to the Jones Act aspect of the case:
He asks us to rule that this applies to an alien seaman on a foreign
ship who signed on at a foreign port, if he sustains injury in a
port of the United States through the negligence of a fellow seaman.
This question was left open [citing Plamals]. Precise authority
on it is meager. Such as there is has answered the question in the
negative [citing Seirstad and Magdapur]. But an American stevc-
dore injured in a forcign ship at an American port may claim the
benefit of the Jones Act [citing Uravic]. So also may an American
seaman [citing Shorter]; and in Arthur, 2 the Act was held
applicable to a stevedore of unproven citizenship injured on a
foreign ship in the Canal Zone. At page 664, there is dictum that
'the right of action is given to all seamen regardless of nationality.'
Likewise the Act.applies to an American owned vessel, though
under foreign registry [citing Gerradin. See also Hutton] . ..
Whether an American seaman on a foreign ship, who had signed
on at a foreign port, could claim tinder the Jones Act is not entirely
clear. In the Uravie opinion, Justice Holmes remarked:
'If it should appear that, by valid contract or special cir-
cumstances, seamen on a foreign ship should not be
protected by the statute, it will be time enough to consider
tile exception when it is presented.'
It is even less clear that a foreign seaman who had signed on at
a foreign port should have the benefit of the Act. We think the
intention to legislate for alien seamen who have signed articles
abroad on a foreign ship ought to be clearly expressed before the
courts extend the statute to them.6 (Italics supplied).
61. 91 F.2d 1001 (2nd Cir. 1937). See Neset v. Skibs A/S Oil Express Co. of
Moss, Nonvay, 93 F. Supp. 530 (E.D. N.Y. 1950).
62. Arthur v. Comp. Gen. 'I rans., 72 F.2d 662 (5th Cir. 1934).
63. 91 F.2d 1001, 1003-1004.
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Three observations may be made as to this discussion by Judge Swan:
First, he cited Magdapur where Jones Act usage was denied because
the seaman was not an American citizen. It should follow that if the Act
were to protect American seamen, then it would be of no consequence where
the articles were signed. Also, no mention was made that the Seirstad
result was crushed by Uravic.
Secondly, though quoting the important language from Uravic, it is
submitted that its application was misunderstood as Judge Swan did not
notice the significance of the word "not." This language says that the Act
applies to all seamen, foreign or American, on foreign ships unless "valid
contract" or "special circumstances" prohibits the application of the Act.
What was meant by "valid contract" or "special circumstances" is impossible
to say with specificity. But, at any rate, in Paula, there was no contract
provision prohibiting the usage of the Act or any "special circumstances"
save a fear of judicial legislation.
Thirdly, at the end of the opinion, Judge Swan spoke in terms of
legislation for "alien seamen who have signed articles abroad on a foreign
ship." Surely, if it is an alien seaman signing on an American vessel in
a foreign port, then the Act applies. Under Magdapur, if the seaman is
American, but the articles are signed abroad on a foreign vessel, then the
Act should apply also. But did Judge Swan mean to say that if the seaman
were an alien who signed articles on a foreign vessel in an American port
the Act would also apply? The implication of Judge Swan's language is
that the Act would apply unless all the elements are foreign saving the
locus of the tort. Thus, a principle of contract would apply over a principle
of tort, notwithstanding that the statute is aimed at delict and not contract
breach. And though there it not one word in the Act justifying such a
result, it does show that the enactment of the statute did mean to change
the ordinary rules of conflict of laws which prevailed before 1920.
Application for the writ of certiorari was made in Paula and was
denied. 4 The principle of the law of the flag still flew with a measure
of its old imperial color and majestic dignity.
WORLD WAR II AND AFTER
With the Second World War years, it became necessary for many
foreign shipowners to shift their shipping industries from the original seats
of their occupations. In the invaded countries that were maritime, princi-
pally Norway and Greece, those shipowners who could escape the Nazi
scourge came to New York to survive and reorganize their maritime
activities, most of which required setting up offices in New York. The
shipping chiefly operated out of New York; however, the ships still retained
their foreign flags. The question then arose as to how the courts would
construe the Jones Act with the new impact that the war had created on
maritime commerce? Though it had been held that a Jones Act suit would
64. Cert. denied, 302 U.S. 750 (1939).
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have to be dismissed where the libel did not allege the place of signing on
and the ports of call of the vessel,65 a new and rather interesting twist came
upon the scene in Gambera v. Bergoty.6 In this case, an action was brought
under the Act in Admiralty in rem and in personam. The former had to
be dismissed as Plamals had held the Jones Act to create no in rem right
of action. The libellant was an Italian citizen who had signed articles in
New York for service aboard a Greek vessel. He had, however, been in the
United States for some twenty years and in 1937 had taken out first
naturalization papers. The voyage of the vessel began and ended in the
United States: it was from Trenton to Philadelphia, then to Norfolk and
New York. Cambera was injured on the leg of the voyage between Trenton
and Philadelphia. The Jones Act remedy was held to apply. In discussing
Paula, Judge L. Hand incorrectly stated the facts by saying the seaman there
was German, who had signed on in Germany, on a German ship, for a
voyage to begin and end in Germany. But the principle of Paula still stood,
though it was distinguishable from Gainbera, since in the latter the libellant
was a resident of the United States who bad his first papers. Furthermore:
The whole voyage was to be performed within our territorial
waters except possibly for a part of the leg between Norfolk and
New York. That presents a wholly different situation from any
that have hitherto arisen.67
As to the matter of nationality and the Jones Act, Judge Hand said:
The Jones Act was the culmination of a series of efforts . . . to
secure adequate relief for American seamen in their employment.
It is extremely unlikely that Congress should have meant to exclude
aliens who . . . were members of that class merely because they
had not been naturalized. . . . In Uravic, it was at least left open
whether the Act applied to foreign seamen and that would go much
further than to apply it to an alien circumstanced like the libellant.
We see nothing in the definitory section... to limit the application
of the Act to American ships or American citizens. As to ships,
Uravic was an express answer and thereafter the definition no longer
afforded an obstacle to including foreign seamen." (Italics supplied).
Counsel observed the error in the statement of Paula's facts. And in
denying a petition for rehearing, the following was said in a per curiam
opinion:
It is true that we did not state the facts in Paula quite accurately;
the libellant in that case signed on in Chile; the ship was Danish;
the voyage was from a Chilean port to Brooklyn. None of these
facts could make the least difference, however, unless it were that
the voyage ended in this country; and that too is immaterial since
it does not concern those facts which we hold to bring the libellant
at bar within the protected class.69 (Italics supplied).
65. Zagoras v. Coumantaros, 1941 Am. Mar. Cas. 306 (S.D.N.Y. 1941).
66. 132 F.2d 414 (2nd Cir. 1942), cert. denied, 119 U.S. 742 (1943). Cf. Puig
V. Royal Norwegian Gov't., 72 F. Supp. 69 (S.D. N.Y. 1947).
67. 132 F.2d 414, 416
68. Ibid.
69. Rehearing denied, 1943 Am. Mar. Gas. 47 (1943).
MIAMI LAW QUARTERLY
The "new twist" added by Gambera was the nature of the voyage as
being within United States waters-beginning and ending in the United
States-and the fact of the long continued residence. Yet, to be sure, there
is nothing in the statute justifying such a conclusion. The court, of
necessity, had to legislate. However, residence itself was later held not to be
enough when the tort occurred on the high seas on a voyage which neither
began nor ended in the United States.70 Thus, it has to be residence plus
to come within the protective warmth of Gambera.
What, next, does Gam bera do to Paula? First, it says that nationality
is no basis for distinction. Secondly, it says that the Act does apply to
foreign vessels. Thirdly, it says nothing about grounding a distinction on
the place of the signing of the articles. Lastly, and most significantly, is
the fact that in Gambera the voyage began and ended here whereas in
Paula, from the opinion on the petition for rehearing, the voyage began
foreign, but ended here after making an intermediate stop in Florida. In
both cases the cause of action arose in our waters-though far closer to
United States soil in Paula. Hence, the only thread upon which the case
was left to hang was that the voyage in Paula did not begin here. Such thin
threads are not bases upon which to leave precedents hanging.
As foreign shipowners were signing on their crews in our ports, with
articles written many times in the language of the vessel's flag, the courts
were not slow to respond. This was displayed by the decision in Kyriakos
v. Goulandris7' and Taylor v. Atlantic Maritime Co.72 (The latter case,
however, will be discussed at a later point in this article). In Kyriakos
a Greek seaman, not a resident here, signed articles in New York for shipment
on a Greek vessel. The voyage of the vessel was to be from the United
States to England and back. Before the vessel was to leave for England
it went to the port of Fernandina, Florida. While there the libellant went
ashore to purchase some personals and, on his way back to the vessel, was
stabbed several times by another member of the crew whose vicious ten-
dencies had been reported previously to the ship's captain to no avail.
Circuit Judge A. N. Hand wrote the opinion for the majority of the court
arid held the Act applicable. In a rather long opinion, he felt several
factors decisive:
In the instant case the libellant signed on in an American port and
lie was injured in an American port. We think this is sufficient
both on reason and on authority.73 (Italics supplied).
To the contention that the Seaman's Act of 1915 read in its title that it
was to promote the welfare of American seamen in the United States
70. O'Neill v. Cumard White Stir, 160 F.2d 446 (2nd Cir. 1947), cert. denied
332 U.S. 773 (1947).
71. 151 F.2d 132 (2nd Cir. 1945).
72. 179 F.2d 597 (2nd Cir. 1950), cert. denied in Atlantic Maritime Co. & S.
Livanos & Co. v. Rankin, 341 U.S. 915 (1951).
73. 151 F.2d 132, 137.
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Merchant Marine, after discussing Uravic and Section 4 of the Act, which
expressly applied to foreign vesscls in our waters, Judge A. N. Hand replied;
WVhen Congress used the word 'seamen" in the Jones Act it
employed a word of general application, embracing men of an)
nation who sail the seas. Had it wished to limit the application
of the statute to seamen of American citizenship or residence, the
words to effectuate the limitation were at hand. The legidlators
did not see fit to use them. \Vith the adjective 'American'
applied to seamen in the title of the very act of which the Jones
Act was an amendment we cannot suppose that its omission from
the statute itself was merely an oversight. Instead, it appears
evident that Congress deliberately chose to leave the word 'seamen'
its full and unrestricted meaning applicable to aliens and Americans
alike unless in a case like Paula ...which we think may be dis-
tinguished. . . . 4 (Italics supplied).
The distinction, of course, was that in Paula articles were signed abroad,
while in Kyriakos articles were signed in New York.
Oddly enough, Judge L. Hand dissented. He argued that in all matters
relating to the "internal economy or discipline" of a vessel the law of the
flag prevails. For this proposition he cited nine cases, eight of which were
pre-Jones Act and the ninth of which was a Jones Act case involving an
American flagship. *This last could be used to argue that if flag law
prevails on American ships so should it also on foreign ships. But at its
least the Act covers American ships. Uravic refused to limit the Act to
domestic vessels. Paula said a personal injury was not an internal orddr
controversy within the meaning of a treaty. Furthermore, in Paula the tort
occurred aboard the ship; in Kyriakos, it was ashore. Whatever "discipline"
was-to be administered was strictly a matter between the ship and the assailant
of Kyriakos unless the "peace of port" principle could be brought into play
to the exclusion of the flag law.75 Neither was the tort in Stewart any the
less "internal economy" than in Kyriakos. Nor was it in Gambera, both
Gambera and Stewart being decisions of L. Hand. If Judge Hand was
74. Id. at 136.
75. Many treaties give the local authorities jurisdiction where "peace of the port"
is brought into play. 26 AM. J. INr'L L. (Supp.) 288 (1932). No distinction is made
whether the act is ashore or on the vessel. ibhe problem really is as to the meaning
of the "peace of the port." It must be a serious offense which would disturb that
peace. In Wildenhus' Case, 120 U.S. 1 (1887), a stabbing occurred on a Belgian vessel
tied up to a pier in New Jersey. Our courts took jurisdiction. See Clung Chi Cheung
v. Rex, 3 All Eng. L. Rep. 786 (1938). In U.S. v. Flores, 289 U.S. 137 (1933), our courts
took jurisdiction of a murder of an American citizen by an American citizen on board
an American vessel while it was at anchor in the Belgian Congo, the basis being that the
jurisdiction was concurrent. Beyond the case of tile felonious homicide it is difficult
to define "peace of the port." A criminal act would seem to be within its meaning
as the public is involved. An assault such as in Kyriakos would be difficult to classify.
I lowever, assuming it was a civil assault, it was so criminally tinged as to bring the
p ublic view to focus and, therefore, should see the assumiption of jurisdiction by the
ocal authorities. For further references see Rousssox,,, ADMIRALT.WY, 234-238 (1939);
Jrssup, Tin: LAw OF TERRTO IAI XVA'IERS 144-193 (1929); Jurisdiction Over National
Vessels, 16 B. U. L. Rev, 115 (1936); Quasi-Territoriality ot Vessels in Foreign Ports,
12 N.YU.L.Q. Rev. 628 (1935) 13 N.Y.U.L.Q. REv. 43 (1935); Criminal Jurisdiction
Over Foreign Merchant Vessels, 10 T"uLAe L. REv. 13 (1935).
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reluctant to "legislate" in Kyriakos, then he certainly "legislated" to produce
the Gambera result.
On conflict of laws bases, before the Act, the general rules were that
matters of tort were to be governed by the flag law. As a matter of contract
there was a preliminary question which was one of interpretation of the
owner's engagements or of their performance. If the former, the law of
the place of the making of the contract would prevail; if the latter, then
the law of the place of performance would prevail. Before Kyriakos, and
even before the Jones Act, as a matter relating to contract, the obligation
vas construed as relating to performance, thus calling for the application
of flag law." But assuming the law of the place of the making of the
contract were to prevail, even if the tort were on the high seas,77 the
difficulty that should then arise is the "internal economy" principle which
would see the visitation of flag law. As a matter of intent, it cannot be
gainsaid that the owner never impliedly wished the application of the Act
for injuries to the seaman. The only question with the Jones Act is how
much did Congress intend to change the traditional rules as well as imposing
on the owner the usage of the statute by an injured seaman?
In none of the cases thus far discussed was the locality of the tort in
itself the deciding feature. It will be recalled that in Gambera the libellant
was a New York resident who shipped on a foreign vessel operating between
New York and Norfolk, and who was injured while in the waters of the
United States. But in O'Neill v. Cunard White Star, Ltd.78 the decedent
was a British subject who had come to this country in 1924 and had made
a declaration of becoming a citizen in 1925, but was never naturalized. His
wife joined him here some years later, and to the couple were born four
children who were American citizens. But their parents still were British
subjects though American residents. Late in 1941, the decedent signed on a
British ship in London for a voyage to Canada and return to England. He
was washed overboard on the high seas as a result of the alleged unsea-
worthiness of the vessel and of the alleged negligence of the defendant's
servants. Action was brought under the General Maritime Law and the
Jones Act. The case was dismissed in the District Court. On appeal to
the Second Circuit, this was affirmed. Judge L. Hand wrote the opinion for
a unanimous court. First, lie held it would be an abuse of discretion not
to hear the case. Then the question arose as to whether the claim was
good on its merits, i.e., whether the decedent himself could have sued
76. The Hanna Nielsen, 273 Fed. 171 (2nd Cir. 1921), cert. denied, 257 U.S.
651 (1921); Oehler v. Hamburg-Amer. Line, 84 Misc. 272, 145 N.Y. Supp. 1090
(Sup. Ct. 1914).
77. Taylor v. Atlantic Maritime Co., 179 F.2d 597 (2nd Cir. 1950), cert. denied,
341 U.S. 915 (1951).
78. 160 F.2d 446 (2nd Gir. 1947), cert. denied, 332 U.S. 773 (1947), 26 m'F s
L. REV. 212 (1947). See Puig v. Royal Norwegian Gov't., 72 F. Supp. 69 (S.D.
N.Y. 1947).
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under the Act had he survived.79 In denying the application of the Act,
the facts of Paula were again incorrectly stated. On conflict of laws principles
tie decedent could not be aided: regarded as a tort, the law of the flag
would govern; viewed as a breach of contract, then the liability would
depend on either the place of the making of the contract or where the
performance failed: the former was in England, the latter was on a British
ship. Thus, British law applied unless the Jones Act changed the result.
Then the question of the locality of the tort was brought into play:
The three decisions we have mentioned [meaning Paula, Gamber
and Kyriakos] do not help us to decide whether we should now
hold that the Jones Act interposes to change what would other-
wise be the rights and duties of the parties, because in all three the
act or omission was within our waters .... It is true that a state
may impose duties upon its own nationals when they are abroad;
but the plaintiff must prove that Congress meant to impose duties
upon the nationals of other states while they were beyond the
territorial limits of the United States, a proposition vastly different
in its consequences. Perhaps Congress might go even so far as
that ...; but surcly there should be the clearest warrant of its
purpose to do so .. 80 (Italics supplied).
As to Uravic, Judge Hand said that there the whole discussion proceeds
on the assumption "that it is a question of lex loci delicti."'s  Thus, he felt
he was thrown back upon the statute itself. In the remainder of the opinion
in O'Neill, Judge Hand spoke in terms of "American seamen" who sign
on in foreign ports and felt the Act was not intended to cover them, as
foreign owners would not sign them on. However, this does not overlook
the importance of the port of signing on and is manifestly contrary to that
which Judge Hand said when he wrote in Stewart:
...for the result would be not only to dcprive American seamen
of the protection which the Act was meant to give them when.
serving on foreign ships ... 82 (Italics supplied)..
O'Neill was only a resident. But such continued residence put hiin
in the same position as an American citizen.11' Yet this was not enough.
The crucial factors in O'Neill would seem to have been the locality of the
tort and the fact that the voyage of the vessel did not touch a United
States port.
79. Because the Act runs to the advantage of the beneficiary, the right to recovery
must be in the decedent himself. That is to say, the right of the beneficiary is derivative
upon the rights of recovering in the decedent. See Van Beeck v. Sabine Towing Co.,
300 U.S. 342 (1937); Flynn v. N.Y., N.H., & 11. R.R., 283 U.S. 53 (1931); Pollard
v. Seas Shipping Co., 1945 Am. Mar. Cas. 119 (2nd Cir. 1945); Emery v. Rochester
Tel. Corp., 271 N.Y. 306, 3 N.E.Zd 434 (1936).
80. 160 F.2d 446, 448.
81. Ibid.
82. Stewart v. Pacific Steam Navigation Co., 3 F.2d 329 (S. D. N.Y. 1924).
83. This would be under the ruling in Gambera. Judge Hand admits the same
in the course of his decision in Taylor v. Atlantic Maritime Co., 179 F.2d 597, 598
(2nd Cir. 1950), where he says that "... we have also denied recovery to an alien,
who was injured on the high seas and who had signed the articles in a foreign port,
although he had resided in this country for twenty years and had applied for naturalization;
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It will be recalled that in an earlier part of this article the New York
Court of Appeals decision in Sonnesen v. Panama Transport Co.. ' was
discussed in one of its aspects. In Sonnesen, both the seaman and the
vessel were foreign. Articles were signed in New York. The voyage of
the vessel began in the United States. Tie tort of which Sonnesen com-
plained occurred on the high seas. Jones Act usage was denied. That
articles were signed in New York was of no consequence. Vhe fact that
foreign shipowners, doing business in New York, were signing on crews
in our ports was held not to pierce the foreign flag. Nor did the court
feel bound to anything pressed upon it by Kyriakos as there the tort occurred
ashore in a United States port. New York expressed its policy in Sonnesen
inasmuch as the Act did not expressly compel it to hear the case. For
whatever might be said of that policy we have to turn our attention to the
case of Taylor v. Atlantic Maritime Co.,85 where Taylor chose to assert
his rights in the New York Federal Courts rather than in the New York
State Courts.
The facts of Taylor are on all fours with Sonnesen. The seaman, Taylor,
oddly enough, was a Panamanian subject. I-Ic was not a resident here. lie
signed articles in Norfolk, Virginia, for shipment aboard a vessel which flew
the Panamanian flag, but was Greek owned. The articles themselves were
in English with wages payable in American dollars. The voyage of the
vessel was a round, beginning and ending in the United States. The
tort of which Taylor made complaint was for the aggravation of tuberculosis
while on the high seas. He sued under the Jones Act. A motion to dismiss
for lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter was granted in the New
York Southern District Court. An appeal was taken to the Second Circuit
Court of Appeals. At this point, it would be interesting to observe how
the precedents should have seen the case decided:
(1). The tort was on the high seas which was a basis for the denial
of the Act's application in O'Neill.
(2). Though articles were signed in a United States port, as they were
in Kyriakos, in the latter the tort occurred ashore in a United States port.
(3). The voyage began and ended in the United States (Kyriakos),
but was not wholly coastwise with the tort occurring in our waters to an
American resident (Gambera).
(4). The signing of articles here was the strongest peg to apply the
Act under Kyriahos. This would not seem to be enough as a sixteen year
residence in O'Neill was insufficient.
The opinion of the court in Taylor was written by Judge L. Hand for a
unanimous court. The Act was held to apply, which necessitated reversal
mid this we held in spite of the fact that for the purtocs of thce Jones Act such a
continued residence puts a seaman in the same position as an American citizen. (Italics
supplied).
84. 298 N.Y. 262, 82 N.E.2d 569 (1948), cert. denied, 337 U.S. 919 (1949).
85. Taylor v. Atlantic Maritime Co., 179 F.2d 597 (2,1d Cit. 1950), cert. denied,
341 U.S. 915 (1951).
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of the District Court. Though Sonnesen was persuasive, it was not con-
trolling. To be sure, the basis of the result in Taylor was the rationale
of the opinion in Kyriakos:
Nevertheless, in spite of what we should hold, were we free, we
think that, although Kyriakos can be distinguished because the
injury took place on shore, the rationale of the opinion went further;
and that it construed the Jones Act as imposing its terms upon
all owners who sign on crews in an American port.86 (Italics
supplied).
Application to the United States Supreme Court was made for the writ
of certiorari, strongly urging the resolution of the conflict which existed
between Taylor and Sonnesen. The writ was denied.87 Of further interest
with Taylor was the fact that it overlooked the place of injury test which
contributed to the result in Kyriakos and was one of the crucial factors in
O'Neill. In Kyriakos it was never uttered that the locus of the injury should
not be considered. And with the test not used in Taylor, we have the
rather startling result that if a foreign seaman signs articles on a foreign
ship in a United States port he can sue under the Act; however, a seaman
who signs articles abroad cannot sue, even though by a long continued
residence he is considered a citizen for purposes of the Act (O'Neill).
It is also interesting to note that Taylor said nothing about sustaining
the Act's application because the voyage of the vessel began and ended in
the United States.
In Kyriakos the seaman signed articles in the United States and was
injured ashore in a United States port. Taylor said that the signing of
articles here was enough to see the Act's application. Would the fact that
the tort alone occurred ashore here be enough? The answer to that
question is found in the recent decision of Catherall v. Cunard S. S. Co.,
Ltd.8  There, the seaman, a Britisher, was a member of the crew of the
Queen Elizabeth. He had signed articles in Southampton, England, for a
voyage to begin and end in England. 'While the vessel was at dock in
New York, Catherall had his left leg mashed on the dock through the
alleged negligence of the defendant. Suit was brought under the Jones
Act and a motion was thereafter made to dismiss it for want of jurisdiction.
Of course, the immediate problem was Paula. Assuming the full vitality
of that case as a precedent, then a twofold distinction could be submitted:
(1). In Paula, the tort was on the vessel while in Catherail it was
ashore. Hence, if applicable, "internal economy" would not cover Catherall
as the-&bitNlas off the ship.
(2). In Paula, though the opinion is highly unsatisfactory on the
point, the vessel seems to have visited our shores only "transiently." In
Uravic, it will be recalled, counsel did contend that if the Act does not
apply it does so only because the vessel is here "transiently." Thus, the
86. id. at 600.
87. 341 U.S. 915 (1951).
88. 101 F. Supp. 230 (S.D. N.Y. 1951).
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implication is strong that if a vessel is here frequently and consisteuly it
will be subject to the imposition of the Jones Act. The Queen Elizabeth
is here as frequently as she is in England. As a result, a good deal of
Cunard's business is done through New York. In Paula such a situation
did not exist.
As to O'Neill, a similar argument could be made as with Taylor.
If residence was not enough in O'Neill then the tort could not be enough
in Catherall. However, here the argument bore fruit! The. Jones Act
claim was dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. As to the second argument
above, District Judge I. R. Kaufman said, "The theory is novel but uncon-
v'incing," and he felt:
In the case at bar, Paula and subsequent cases dictate that the law of
the flag should not yicld.81'
It is submitted that the judicial "psychology" in this field sharply
changed during World War II. Before the War Years it is dubious if
we would ever have had the results that we do in Taylor and Kyriakos. In
short, when foreign shipowners came to the United States and established
their head business offices here, which in many cases resulted in the signing
on of crews in our ports, our courts operated on a new theme, the harmony
of which was predicated upon a rough analogy to the concept of "doing
business" in the personal jurisdiction cases.?0  True! The essence of mari-
time commerce is contact. But it was substantial contact to which the
attention of the courts was addressed. O'Neill is not inconsonant with this
conclusion as the vessel there never touched a United States port. In
Catherall, however, there can not really be any question of the substantiality
of contact with our shores by the Queen Elizabeth.
It will next be recalled that in the majority opinion in Kyriakos, Judge
A. N. Hand said that the bases of the decision were that articles were
signed in New York and that the tort occurred ashore in a United States
port. Taylor said that under the Kyriakos rationale articles signed here was
enough. Thus, one of the two bases of Kyriakos was sufficiently persuasive
to see the Act's coverage. Then, is there not some slight inference that if
the tort occurred ashore here, though articles are signed abroad, the Act
should also apply? This is supported by the language of Judge L. Hand in
Taylor, which was quoted in our discussion of that case. If this is forceful,
then, whatever may be said of Paula, Catherall, as it now stands, is wrongly
decided.
89. Id. at 233.
90. The personal jurisdiction "doing business" concept aninounced in international
Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945), was carried further in Neset v. Christensen,
92 F. Supp. 78 (E.D.N.Y. 1950), and even further in the very well reasoned opinion of
District Judge Weinfeld in Szabo v. Smedvig Tank-Rederi A.S., 95 F. Supp. 519 (S.D.
N.Y. 1951), the latter case involving a suit by an Hungarian seaman against a Nonvegian
shipowner while the vessel was on time charter. Service on the New York agent was
upheld. Cf. Andrade v. American Mail Lines, 71 F. Supp. 201 (D. R.I. 1947). But
the analogy between the personal and substantive cases is only a very rough one. In the
latter the business concept is not the end factor in and of itself. It is only meant to
be said that it has entered the judicial thinking in this field.
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Except for Uravic and Plamals, the Supreme Court followed a consistent
line in refusing to grant the writ of certiorari in the cases which have
been discussed. However, it finally yielded and granted the writ in the
case of Lauritzen v. Larsen,9' and handed down its decision in May, 1953.
The facts of Larsen are similar to Taylor, though not on all fours with it.
The seaman was a Dane who signed articles for shipment in New York
aboard a Danish vessel. lie was negligently injured aboard the ship when
it was in Havana harbor. Suit was brought under the Jones Act. The
District Court and the Second Circuit Court of Appeals held the Jones
Act applicable on the authority of Taylor and Kyriakos. The Supreme
Court reversed. The vote was seven to one. Mr. Justice Jackson was the
author of the majority opinion. Mr. Justice Clarke did not participate and
Mr. Justice Black dissented without opinion. In a rather long opinion, Mr.
Justice Jackson found nothing in the Act which embraced Larsen. On
conflict of laws principles there was an "overwhelming preponderance"
favoring the application of Danish law:
TPhe parties are both Danish subjects, the events took place on a
Danish ship, not within our territorial waters. Against these
considerations is only the fact that the defendant was served here
with process and that the plaintiff signed on in New York, where
the defendant was engaged in our foreign commerce. The latter
event is offset by provision of his contract that the law of Denmark
should govern. We do not question the power of Congress to
condition access to our ports by foreign owned vessels upon sub-
mission to any liabilities it may consider good American policy to
exact. But we can find no justification for interpreting the Jones
Act to intervene between foreigners and their own law because of
acts on a foreign ship not in our waters.'2 (Italics supplied).
By this discussion the question is left open whether the Act can
be applied to a transaction between foreigners for a tort occurring either
within United States waters or on United States soil. If it can, decisions
such as Paula and Catherall must be cast into oblivion. However, earlier
in the course of the Larsen opinion, Mr. Justice Jackson had substantial
doubts whether, with propriety, the territorial law could be applied, for
he said:
But the territorial standard is so unfitted to an enterprise conducted
under inany territorial rules and under none that it usually is
modified by the more constant law of the flag."" (Italics supplied).
Thus, were the doubts resolved into realities, Kyriakos would have to be
buried whereas Paula and Catherall would remain sound. The result in
Gambera would still stand inasmuch as a resident of the United States was
concerned, but not because he was injured within our waters on a vessel
whose voyage was between New York and Norfolk. Then what would
91. 345 U.S. 571 (1953).
92. Id. at 592-593.
93. Id. at 584.
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become of O'Neill? That decision, as it now stands, would also have to
fall as erroneous. Indeed, Mr. Justice Jackson said that:
. .. each nation has a legitimate interest that its nationals and
permanent inhabitants be not maimed or disabled from self-support.
In some later American cases, courts have been prompted to apply
the Jones Act by the fact that the wrongful act or omission caused
injury to an American citizen or domicilary.4  (Italics supplied).
For this proposition he cited Uravic, Shorter, and Gambera without
making any comment about O'Neill.95 Furthermore, no mention was made
in Larsen of a consideration of the nature of the vessel's voyage-an element
so decisive in O'Neill. Though this has never in itself been a singularly
crucial factor, it has been a persuasive feature in several of the cases
hereinbefore discussed. Therefore, some of the questions that Larsen
leaves open it seems to answer in the negative. As a result, the Act should
read, "Any American seaman or resident who shall suffer personal injury..."
rather than "Any seaman .... " The broad reading given the Act by' Mr.
Justice Holnes in Uravic, is overruled, though not expressly, and that case
is limited to its facts without ever having been discussed during the pages
of Larsen. What remains of the "liberal interpretation" of the Act which
a plenthora of cases have mandated? While Larsen answers its own question,
as well as those of Taylor, Sonnesen, and possibly even Kryiakos, it leaves
so much unsettled as to invite many applications for the writ of certiorari,
somc of which should be granted to clarify the questions which it leaves
open'
CONCLUSION
Basically, the entire problem with the foreign seaman field has been
one of statutory construction. More fundamentally, the enigma is the
meaning of the word "any" in the Act. Clearly, the Act does not apply
where the seaman is foreign, not a resident, the vessel is foreign owned,
with articles having been signed abroad, and the tort occurs on the high
94. Id. at 586.
95. In an extended footnote (numbered 3 on pp. 573-574 of the Larsen opinion)
Mr. Justice Jackson discusses earlier decisions of the Second Circuit which he thinks
are "at least superficially . . . at variance" with their decision in Larsen v. Lauritzen, 196
F.2d 220 (2nd Cir. 1952). Taylor in no major way is at variance. 'he basis of
Taylor was only that Taylor signed articles in Norfolk, not because he was an alleged
resident. Taylor could be distinguished from Larsen, because the locus of the tort was
different, but, in Taylor, the locus of the tort was in no way a feature of the decision.
Mr. Justice Jackson regards Paula as consistent with earlier Second Circuit decisions.
lie cites IHannah Nielsen, 273 Fed. 171 (2nd Cir. 1921) and Planals. The former
was a pre-Jones Act case; the latter answered the question of whether the Act granted
an n reri proceeding. Neither is apposite. Furthermore. if anything, language in
Paula supports the results in Kyriakos, T aylor, and the Second Circuit decision in Larsen
as already has been shown in the body of this article. 'lere is nothing in Paula
necessarily repugnant to these three decisions. So far as O'Neill should detain us, there
is utterly no mention made-of the fact of his long continnal residence in the United
States. The last sentence of this footnote reads "But they illustrate different con-
siderations which influence choice'of law in maritime tort cases." (Italics supplied). B%
the words "choice of law" is meant the usage of ordinary principles of conflict of laws.
But the question really is whether the statute covers the case involved regardless of the
ordinary rules. To use these rules is only to disregard the fact that a statute is brought
into play. The citation of Uravic on p. 586 is not wholly correct because the decision
there did not go off on a citizenship basis.
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seas or a foreign port.9 6 Larsen says that although articles are signed here,
and the vessel has substantial contact with our ports, the Act still does not
apply. When should it apply?
The breadth of the Act cannot be questioned. Mr. Justice Jackson
feared that:
. . . Congress has extended our law and opened our courts to all
alien seafaring men injured anywhere in the world in service of
watercraft of every foreign nation-a hand on a Chinese junk, never
outside Chinese waters, would not be beyond its literal wording. "7
But this does not compel so limiting a construction as to return us to
pre-Jones Act rationality on the bases of conflict of laws principles. If
Congress wished the Act only to apply to American citizens or residents,
it, could easily have said so. If it wished to exclude foreign seamen, the
words of exclusion were equally available. Certainly, if the Act is to be
"liberally construed," it must be done horizontally as well as vertically.
That sonic limitation upon the word "any" was intended to be imposed
can not substantially be doubted. The Chinese hand on the Chinese junk
injured in Chinese waters really should not be allowed to receive the Act's
fruits because he can effectuate service of process on the employer in the
United States. But if the Chinese hand were an American resident, or
signed articles in an American port, or was negligently injured on United
States soil or in American territorial waters, or the voyage of his vessel is
to be wholly within our waters, or is to begin and end here-these are
jurisdictional facts upon which the Act's application can be predicated.
Thus, the Act would receive the broader construction which its words
suggest. It would not, for all its breadth, cover a situation such as that which
raises the misgiving of Mr. Justice Jackson.
In Larsen, Mr. Justice Jackson remarked that:
Maritime law . . . has attempted to avoid or resolve conflicts
between competing laws . . .
and he said further:
.. in dealing with international commerce we cannot be unmindful
of the necessity for mutual forbearance if retaliations are to be
avoided; nor should we forget that any contact which we hold
sufficient to warrant application of our law to a foreign transaction
will logically be as strong a warrant for a foreign country to apply
its law to an American transaction.8 (Italics supplied).
Although Mr. justice Jackson is filled with great trepidation this should
little disconcert one for three reasons:
(1). The cases decided adversely to foreign shipowners before Larsen
saw no retaliations.
(2). The sections of the Seamen's Act of 1915 which have expressly
subjected foreign vessels to our law in order to allow seamen to obtain
96. Tsitsinakis v. Simpson, Spence & Young, 90 F. Supp. 578 (S.D.N.Y. 1950).
See Bonsalem v. Byron S.S. Corp., 50 F.2d 114' (2nd Cir. 1931); Maia v. Lamport &
1 lolt, Ltd., 141 Misc. 140, 252 N.Y. Supp. 201 (1931).
97. 345 U.S. 571, 577.
98. Id. at 582,
MIAMI LAW QUARTERLY
one half of their earned wages"" (which has been constitutionally
upheld)' and to advances made to seamen in our ports,1 1 though not
to advances made in foreign ports, 10 2 has caused no strife and international
conflict.
(3). While a foreign country could apply its law to an American
transaction, it is the seaman who can sue under it if he so chooses. Other-
wise, on the basis of his American citizenhip, he can sue and receive
the fruits of the Act.
Other of our maritime laws have been imposed on or can be used
by foreign shipowners."' If they can receive the benefits of our laws why
should they not endure the burdens as well? But this can not be of "great" aid
in ascertaining the meaning of the word "any."
It has been submitted that the Act should more broadly be construed
than Larsen logic would lead us to do. The courts would necessarily
be legislating as is frequently the case with a broad Congressional mandate.
Indeed, the happiest solution would be for the Congress to speak again,
speak as it omitted to speak in 1920, speak with the same spirit and
beneficence which was that of the begetters of the Jones Act! Until that
time the foreign flag in our ports still can fly with much respect and judicial
deference. The desire for the equalization of operating cost of all vessels
remains beclouded in a haze of Foreign Imperial Color.
99. 38 STAT. 1164 (1915), 46 U.S.C. § 569 (1946).
100. Strathearn S.S. Co. v. Dillon, 252 U.S. 348 (1920).
101. Heros v. Cockinos, 1949 Am. Mar. Cas. 2046 (4th Cir. 1949); Lakos v.
Saliaris, 116 F.2d 440 (4th Cir. 1940); The Italier, 237 Fed. 712 (2nd Cit. 1919);
Stavridis v. Cia Panamena Europa Navegacion, Ltda., 90 F. Supp. 187 (S.D. N.Y. 1950);
The Elizabeth Maersk, 258 Fed. 765 (E.D. La. 1919); Kikilis v. Niarchas, 1949 Am.
Mar. Cas. 709 (N.Y. City Ct. 1949). See Patterson v. The Bark Eudora, 190 U.S. 169(1903.10. Sandberg v. McDonald, 248 U.S. 185 (1918); Neilson v. Rhine Shipping
Co., 248 U.S. 105 (1918). See Jackson v. S.S. Archimedes, 275 U.S. 463 (1928).
103. 27 STAT. 445, 446 (1893), 46 U.S.C. §§ 190-195 (1946) (Harter Act); 49
STAT. 1207 (1936), 46 U.S.C. §§ 1300-1315 (1946) (The Carriage of Goods by Sea
Act); 9 STAT. 635, 636 (1851). additions in 16 STAT. 458 (1871), as amended, 19 STAT.
251 (1877), 25 STAT. 80 1886), and amended in the Sirovich Bill in 1936 which
is now 46 U.S.C. §§ 181-189; 26 STAT. 425 (1890), 33 U.S.C. § 367 (1946) (The
Stand-By Act); 22 STAT. 186, 187, 188 (1882), 35 STAT. 583 (1908), 46 U.S.C. §§
151-162 (1946) (Passenger Act); The Safety at Sea Convention, NAVICATTON LAWS OF
THE UNITED STATES 89113 (1940).
